Ethical views prioritising the reduction of suffering
Suffering-focused ethics are views in ethics that give special priority to the reduction of suffering. Some suffering-focused views hold that reducing suffering is the only moral aim, while others treat it as one aim among others, such as reducing inequality or promoting pleasure, but give it greater weight than those other aims.[1]
Types of suffering-focused ethics
The term "suffering-focused ethics" covers several normative positions that give priority to reducing suffering. One example is negative consequentialism. On this view, actions should be assessed according to whether they bring about states of affairs with less suffering. A form of negative consequentialism is negative utilitarianism, according to which one should seek to minimise aggregate suffering, counting each individual's suffering equally.[2]
Other suffering-focused views are non-consequentialist. In suffering-focused deontological ethics, the duty to reduce suffering is treated as especially weighty and may override other duties, though it may itself be overridden in some cases. On such views, this duty should be followed even where violating it would produce a better overall outcome.[3]
Some suffering-focused views concern moral character. On these views, the aim of a moral agent is to develop attitudes and dispositions oriented towards reducing suffering. These may be described in terms of virtue, or in terms of care and responsiveness to suffering.[4]
Suffering-focused ethics and negative ethics
Some suffering-focused views have been described in philosophical literature as "negative" views, because they prioritise the reduction of negative value over the promotion of positive value.[5][6][7] The term remains common in names such as negative consequentialism and negative utilitarianism. The term "suffering-focused ethics" has been used in the 21st century to refer to a wider family of views that share a concern with giving priority to suffering reduction.[8]
Role of positive value
Suffering-focused views differ over whether values other than the reduction of suffering have moral importance. Some views deny that positive values matter in themselves, and hold that only negative values are morally relevant.[9] Other views, such as tranquilist views, allow that positive states may be valuable, but only instrumentally, insofar as they prevent or reduce suffering.[10]
Lexical views hold that some values have priority over others in such a way that they cannot be outweighed by lesser values.[11] In suffering-focused versions of these views, reducing suffering takes precedence over the promotion of positive goods, even if those goods are valued intrinsically.[citation needed]
Moderate suffering-focused views give greater moral weight to reducing suffering than to promoting other values or reducing other disvalues, while still treating those other concerns as morally relevant.[12]
Arguments in favour
Supporters of suffering-focused views have argued that they can account for asymmetries in population ethics. One proposed asymmetry is that there is no obligation to bring into existence an individual whose life would be good, but there is an obligation not to bring into existence an individual whose life would be bad.[13][14][15][16][17] Suffering-focused views can explain this asymmetry by giving priority to avoiding the creation of suffering over creating happiness.[18][19]
A related argument appeals to the view that it may be permissible not to benefit others, but impermissible to cause them suffering. Jamie Mayerfeld argues that many people would reject causing one person suffering in order to produce a slightly greater amount of pleasure for another person.[3]
Another argument holds that there is an asymmetry between happiness and suffering because suffering has urgency, especially in severe cases, whereas the absence of pleasure does not necessarily present an urgent problem requiring relief.[3][8][20]
Some writers also argue that suffering, including severe suffering, is widespread and can often be reduced, while intense positive experiences are rarer and harder to create.[21] Similar priorities have been associated with some interpretations of Buddhist ethics and with the work of 19th-century philosophers such as Arthur Schopenhauer.[22][23]
Criticism of symmetry between suffering and happiness
Some normative views, including some forms of utilitarianism, treat suffering and happiness symmetrically, in the sense that a quantity of suffering can be offset by a sufficient quantity of happiness.[24]Karl Popper criticised this idea, arguing that utilitarianism mistakenly assumes a continuous pleasure-pain scale on which degrees of pain can be balanced against degrees of pleasure. According to Magnus Vinding, Popper's view rejects the idea that one person's suffering can be morally outweighed by another person's happiness.[25]:30
Thomas Metzinger has also argued against a simple symmetry between suffering and happiness. He describes suffering as involving an "urgency of change", in contrast with neutral or untroubled states, which do not demand relief in the same way.[25]:35
Some writers have argued that experiences regarded as neutral may be affected by subtle dissatisfaction that goes unnoticed through habituation.[26] On this view, some pursuits of happiness may instead be attempts to escape dissatisfaction, which would support giving priority to the reduction of suffering.[8]:33
See also
Antifrustrationism– Axiological position which prioritizes avoiding preference frustration
Antinatalism– Value judgment that procreation is unethical
↑Adams, Carol J. (1996). "Caring about Suffering: A Feminist Exploration". In Donovan, Josephine; Adams, Carol J. (eds.). Beyond Animal Rights: A Feminist Caring Ethic for the Treatment of Animals. New York: Continuum. pp.170–196.
↑Narveson, Jan (1978). "Future People and Us". In Sikora, R. I.; Barry, Brian (eds.). Obligations to Future Generations. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. pp.38–60.
Mayerfeld, Jamie (1996). "The Moral Asymmetry of Happiness and Suffering". Southern Journal of Philosophy. 34 (3): 317–38. doi:10.1111/j.2041-6962.1996.tb00795.x.
Mayerfeld, Jamie (1999). Suffering and Moral Responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Leighton, Jonathan (2011). The Battle for Compassion: Ethics in an Apathetic Universe. New York: Algora.
