Conflict of interest

A conflict of interest occurs when an individual's duties and responsibilities are in opposition to their personal or financial interests. For example, US Department of Interior employees should recuse themselves if their decisions could have a direct and predictable effect on their financial interests or those of their family members or close associates.^[12] However, even in cases where the conflict does not mandate recusal under the Code of Ethics, public officials might still choose to recuse themselves voluntarily to avoid any appearance of bias or impropriety.^[13] This also applies to cases when Federal Judges have close personal or professional relationships with attorneys or other parties involved in the case.^[14]

The presence of financial interests that could be affected by the outcome of a case is another critical reason for recusal. For U.S. federal judges, this includes any ownership of legal or equitable interests, no matter how small, or relationships such as director or adviser in the affairs of a party.^[15] The Due Process clauses of the United States Constitution, for example, explicitly require judges to recuse themselves from cases where they have a financial interest in the outcome.^[16]

Bias or prejudice

Personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or the lawyer of that party is a significant ground for recusal in the United States.^[17] The Due Process clauses of the United States Constitution explicitly require judges to recuse themselves from cases where there is a strong possibility the decision would be biased.^[16] In North Carolina, however, mere allegations of bias or prejudice are inadequate; there must be substantive evidence to compel recusal.^[18] Some Judges and officials are advised to recuse themselves from cases where they have engaged in policy advocacy or public comments that could affect their impartiality.^[19] In Rhode Island, public officials who recuse themselves from certain matters may still engage in public comment under specific conditions, such as the "Public Forum Exception".^[20] However, this exception is limited and does not allow officials to represent others or act as expert witnesses in forums restricted to the general public.^[20]

Professional history

Previous professional experience can also be potential grounds for recusal. If the judge was involved in the case’s litigation in another court, served as a witness for an involved party, if the judge previously argued the case as a lawyer, or if they worked in a government position that had previously made them involved in opinion/action on the case, there would be grounds for recusal according to Canon 2 Rule 2.11(A)(6)(a-d) of the American Bar Association’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct.^[21]

Political causes

In some cases, litigants have called for a judge’s recusal due to their racial identity on the grounds that their race gives them inherent bias in judicial decision-making.^[22] These cases are often brought against judges of color who are thought to be inherently partial towards people who share their racial identity. In Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, for example, the case’s defendants pushed for presiding Judge Higginbotham to recuse himself for conflict of interest; the case was about employment discrimination, and the white litigants did not trust Judge Higginbotham, a Black judge, to rule impartially due to his racial identity.^[22][23] Judge Higginbotham refused to recuse himself, citing that “determinations of judicial bias must begin by first assuming that all judges have a race, a gender, and a professional background,” and therefore it would be unjust to disqualify a justice for their race and personal perspectives given that everyone has both.^[23][22]

This issue of recusal on the basis of race has continued into the 21st century courts. In State v. Robinson, the first North Carolina death penalty case reviewed for prejudice under the Racial Justice Act, the state prosecutors called for presiding Judge Gregory Weeks’ recusal.^[24][25] Their rationale for the recusal request was their belief that Judge Weeks would better serve the case as a witness than as its judge given his previous experience presiding over death penalty cases.^[25] The prosecutors’ reasoning fell under scrutiny by both defendant Marcus Robinson’s own lawyer and external legal experts who believed that the prosecutors were attempting to remove Weeks, a Black male judge, from the case due to his race.^[25] Superior Court Judge Quentin Sumner turned down the prosecutors’ request to remove Weeks, arguing that they had insufficiently evidenced the benefit of Weeks’ service as a witness in their subpoena.^[25] In keeping with Sumner’s decision, Judge Weeks stayed on as the judge in the case’s court proceedings.^[25]

Additionally, many scholars argue that racial diversity on the bench actually enriches the fairness and justice of the courts instead of threatening it. These arguments are parts of larger movements for increased judicial diversity to represent the American public and enhance institutional legitimacy.^[22]

Some claim that strong religious conviction could warrant a judge’s recusal, as the judge may find themselves torn in allegiance to their sacred text and the Constitution.^[26] Per the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, judges are expected to check their own conflict of interest in cases where they might enact their religious bias.^[27] However, there is much conflict on the constitutionality of religious recusal, as it bumps up against the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause, as well as the 3rd Clause of Article VI that repudiates any “religious Test” as part of the “Qualification” for any U.S. office.^[27][28][29] Like in the case of racial diversity on the bench, some counter this argument for the need to recuse oneself on the basis of religious conviction by claiming that religion can be a “useful background and focusing tool” that should have its own place in judicial decision-making.^[27]

Supreme Court cases

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In the Supreme Court of the United States, the Justices have historically recused themselves from participating in cases in which they have financial interests. For example, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor generally did not participate in cases involving telecommunications firms because she owned stock in these firms, and Justice Stephen Breyer disqualified himself in some cases involving insurance companies because of his participation in a Lloyd's of London syndicate. Justices also have declined to participate in cases in which close relatives, such as their children, are lawyers for one of the parties. Even if the family member is connected to one of the parties but is not directly involved in the case, justices may recuse themselves – for instance Clarence Thomas recused himself in United States v. Virginia because his son was attending Virginia Military Institute, whose policies were the subject of the case. On occasion, recusal occurs under more unusual circumstances; for example, in two cases, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist stepped down from the bench when cases were argued by Arizona attorney James Brosnahan, who had testified against Rehnquist at his confirmation hearing in 1986. Whatever the reason for recusal, the United States Reports will record that the named justice "took no part in the consideration or decision of this case".^{[citation needed]}

A notable case was the 2001 death penalty appeal by Napoleon Beazley, convicted of a 1994 murder, in which a full three justices recused themselves due to personal ties to the victim's son, federal appeals court judge J. Michael Luttig. Luttig had previously clerked for Justice Scalia, and had led the confirmation efforts on behalf of both David Souter and Clarence Thomas. The death sentence was upheld all the same.^{[citation needed]}

Historically, standards for recusal in the Supreme Court and lower courts were less rigorous than they have become in more recent years. In the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice John Marshall participated in the decision and authored the opinion of the Court even though Marshall's actions as Secretary of State two years prior could be seen as the subject of the proceeding. On the other hand, Marshall did recuse himself in both the 1813 and 1816 hearings of Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, despite its equally significant constitutional implications, as he and his brother had contracted with Martin to buy the land in dispute. Moreover, during the 19th century, the U.S. federal court system was structured so that an appeal from a judge's decision was often heard by an appellate panel containing the same judge, who was expected to sit in impartial review of his own earlier ruling. This situation is no longer permissible, and 28 U.S.C. § 47 provides that "No judge shall hear or determine an appeal from the decision of a case or issue tried by him."^{[citation needed]}

A notable dispute over recusal in U.S. Supreme Court history took place in 1946, when Justice Hugo Black participated in deciding the Jewell Ridge Coal case, although a former law partner of Black argued for the prevailing side. The losing party in the 5–4 decision sought reargument on the ground that Black should have been disqualified; Black declined to recuse himself and the decision stood, but Justice Robert H. Jackson wrote a short opinion suggesting that the decision that Black should sit in the case was Black's alone and the Court did not endorse it. The dispute aggravated infighting between Black and Jackson, and it has been suggested that this was one of the reasons that, when Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone died, President Harry S. Truman appointed Fred M. Vinson to succeed Stone rather than promote a sitting Associate Justice to Chief Justice.^{[citation needed]}

In 1973, then-Associate Justice Rehnquist wrote a lengthy in-chambers opinion declining to recuse himself in Laird v. Tatum, a case challenging the validity of certain arrests, even though Rehnquist had previously served as a White House lawyer and opined that the arrest program was valid.^[39] In 2004, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote an opinion declining to recuse himself in a case to which Vice President Dick Cheney was a party in his official capacity, despite the contention of several environmental groups that Scalia's participation created an appearance of impropriety because Scalia had recently participated in a widely publicized hunting trip with the Vice President.^[40][41] The same year, however, Scalia recused himself without explanation in Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, a First Amendment case challenging inclusion of the words "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance, after giving a public speech in which Scalia stated his view that Newdow's claims were meritless.^[1]

In 2009, the Supreme Court ruled 5-4 that 'excessive' campaign contributions to a justice that was elected required a justice to recuse himself, citing the Due Process Clause of the constitution.^[42]

In 2024, Justices Alito and Thomas refused calls to recuse themselves from January 6th cases where their spouses have taken public stances or been involved in efforts to overturn the election.^{[43][44][45][46]}

In March 2025, five of the nine Supreme Court justices recused themselves in the case of Baker vs. Coates. Four of the five (Sotomayor, Barett, Gorsuch, and Brown Jackson) had been previously published by Penguin Random House, owned by Bertelsmann SE & Co. KGaA, one of the defendants.^[47] These four justices’ previous involvement with the publishing company could have given them financial incentive in their ruling on the case, and therefore presented a conflict of interest in their presiding over it.^[48] Alito had no previous partnership with Bertelsmann SE & Co. KGaA; the grounds for his recusal remain unclear.^[47]

In January 2026, Justice Samuel Alito recused himself in the case between Louisiana parishes and oil conglomerates accused of doing environmental damage in the state.^[49] With financial investments in many oil companies, his recusal came on the grounds of financial conflict of interest that could impact his ability to be impartial in the trial proceedings.^[49][50]

Federal cases

On September 28, 2021, the Wall Street Journal's investigative team found that 131 judges did not recuse themselves in cases where they had a financial interest through ownership of stocks in the relevant parties. Two-thirds of such cases ended with a verdict favorable to the party in which the judge owned stock. Explanations given for the lack of recusal included: unknown ownership via brokers investing on behalf of the judge, being unaware of the laws regarding disclosure and recusal, spelling errors and ownership of subsidiaries (e.g. Exxon Corp. vs Exxon Oil, which is a subsidiary), ownership of stocks held not by the judge but by close family members (spouses, children, etc.), and insistence that stock ownership did not influence their decisions (especially if the outcome did not change stock price). All of these explanations have still been considered a violation of federal law by some experts.^[51]

A significant dispute over recusal occurred in 1946 when Justice Hugo Black participated in the Jewell Ridge Coal case despite a conflict involving his former law partner. This case highlighted the ongoing challenges in maintaining impartiality and the evolving nature of recusal practices. Throughout much of its history, the U.S. Supreme Court relied on the justices' discretion and common-law principles to decide recusal matters.^[52] In 1974, federal judge Leon Higginbotham issued his decision in Comm. of Pa. v. Local 542, Int'l Union of Operating Engineers, explaining why he as an African American judge with a history of active involvement in the civil rights struggle was not obligated to recuse himself from presiding over litigation concerning claims of racial discrimination.^[53] He held, in an opinion that was followed by later judges, including a series of black judges who faced recusal requests, that a judge should not be forced to recuse solely because of their membership in a minority group.^[54] Jewish federal Judge Paul Borman relied on the Higginbotham opinion in part in his 2014 decision not to recuse himself from the trial of Palestinian-American Rasmea Odeh.^[54] Similarly, in 1994, Jewish then-federal-Judge Michael Mukasey refused to recuse himself in a case concerning the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, warning that his recusal would "disqualify not only an obscure district judge such as the author of this opinion, but also Justices Brandeis and Frankfurter ... each having been both a Jew and a Zionist".^[54]

Proposed reforms

Many scholars find issue with the United States recusal process, as it asks judges who have perceived bias to recuse themselves.^[55][38][4] In doing so, the process assumes that judges can accurately discern their own bias and that they will reliably disqualify themselves because of it.^[4] Additionally, the self-policing nature of the recusal standards can discourage attorneys from calling for a judge’s recusal due to concern of “judicial retribution” for questioning a judge’s impartiality.^[4] Following these doubts, there have been many proposals for reform to the recusal process, including, but not limited to, those listed below.

Administrative agency and other matters

Outside the judicial system, the concept of recusal is also applied in administrative agencies. When a member of a multi-member administrative body is recused, the remaining members typically determine the outcome. When the sole occupant of an official position is recused, the matter may be delegated to the official's deputy or to a temporarily designated official; for example, when the Solicitor General of the United States is recused from a case, the Deputy Solicitor General will handle the matter in his or her place. For example, in 1990, U.S. Attorney General Richard Thornburgh recused himself from an investigation due to his connection with a subject involved in the case.^[57] On March 2, 2017, Jeff Sessions, Attorney General of the U.S., recused himself while the department investigated Russian interference in the 2016 election due to concerns over his impartiality as a member of the Trump campaign team.^[58]

In Rhode Island, best practices suggest that an official should leave the room during discussions of the matter they are recused from, especially in executive sessions where the presence of the recused individual could be inappropriate.^[59] As of 2024, the Department of the Interior suggested that documenting recusal decisions in writing can be useful to clarify the scope and ensure transparency.^[60]

United States

• Lazarus, Richard J. (March 2026). "Lessons from the States for Promoting Procedural Regularity in U.S. Supreme Court Justice Recusals". Iowa Law Review. ISSN 0021-0552.
• Parker, Brett (Summer 2023). "Drawing the Due Process Line: Judicial Campaigns and Constitutional Recusal" (PDF). Harvard Law & Policy Review. ISSN 1935-2077.
• Virelli III, Louis J. (2022). "Recusal in Administrative Adjudication". Arizona Law Review. ISSN 0004-153X.
• Flamm, Richard E. (2015). Judicial disqualification: Recusal and disqualification of judges. Berkeley: Banks & Jordan Law. ISBN 978-1-890080-04-4.
• Bassett, Debra Lyn (2005). "Recusal and the Supreme Court". Hastings Law Journal. 56: 657.