ENSIKLOPEDIA
Appanage Russia

Appanage Russia,[a][1] also known as the period of appanages or the appanage period,[b][2] refers to a period in Russian history dated between the 12th and 15th centuries.[3]
Following the disintegration of Kievan Rus', over a dozen independent principalities emerged due to feudal fragmentation.[4] Those principalities in turn fragmented further due to the custom of princes dividing their territories into appanages, which led to the proliferation of smaller appanage principalities.[5] The Grand Principality of Vladimir, for instance, fragmented into over a dozen appanages by the end of the 13th century.[6] These polities, known collectively as the Russian principalities,[c] were ruled by princes from the Rurikid dynasty.[7] From this point on, medieval Russia constituted a loose conglomerate of principalities alongside two city-republics: Novgorod and Pskov.[8]
By the late 15th and early 16th centuries, the remaining Russian principalities had been united with the Grand Principality of Moscow, leading to the creation of a centralized state.[9] The end of the appanage period is typically dated to the reign of Ivan III (1462–1505) and it was succeeded by a new period in Russian history, known as Muscovite Russia.[10]
History
Background
Following the death of Yaroslav the Wise in 1054, Kievan Rus' experienced a period of civil strife between his sons Iziaslav, Sviatoslav and Vsevolod.[11] The following century, this was followed by a period of political fragmentation and decentralization.[11] The proliferation of many smaller principalities weakened political unity, and by the mid-12th century, the capital Kiev was in decline.[11] The lack of political unity in part facilitated the Mongol conquest.[12] The traditional view has been that Kiev was in economic decline from the mid-12th century; however, some recent historians have instead adopted the view that there was economic expansion in the late Kievan period as the creation of new appanages represented the division of labor and delegation of authority among the Rurikids.[13]
13th–15th centuries
Following the Christianization of Kievan Rus' in 988, spiritual leadership belonged to the Byzantine Empire.[14] However, from the mid-13th century, the Russian principalities were dominated by the Golden Horde following their conquest by Batu Khan.[15] Previously, princes and grand princes governed themselves and only had to acknowledge the spiritual ascendancy of the Byzantine emperor, but during Mongol rule, they had to be confirmed by the Mongol khan in order to have any power, and the Russians later began referring to the khan as tsar – a title that had previously been reserved for the universal Christian ruler.[16] The only Russian district that was not governed by a prince was Novgorod, although it still depended on an extraneous prince and his army to defend its borders.[17]
Güyük Khan appointed his own governors to oversee the Russian principalities.[18] The tribute was known as the dan by the Russians; its main purpose was not only to tax subjects but also to conscript young men into the Mongol armies.[18] Although the Russian princes did not unanimously support Mongol supervision at first, Mengu-Timur was able to strengthen his ties with the Russian principalities by making the Russian Church cooperate with the Mongol administrators.[19] In 1267, he made Russian clergy exempt from taxation and military service, which was in line with the Mongol policy of religious tolerance.[19][20] From the 1260s, local nobles collected taxes on the khan's behalf, and in an attempt to gain the support of the nobility, the Mongols allowed them to keep their land.[21] Until 1380, the khans of the Golden Horde exercised political control over the Russian principalities, and from 1380 to 1480, they continued to demand tribute from the Russian princes, although they did not always receive this.[22] The period until 1480 is known as the "Tatar yoke".[20] Extrapolating from 1549 data, George Vernadsky estimated the annual tribute to be approximately 145,000 rubles, plus an additional 25,000 rubles from Novgorod under a special tax, equivalent to 15.6 tons of silver.[23]
The leading Russian figure was the grand prince of Vladimir, which led to a struggle among the princes for the title.[24] The grand prince had the right to collect the taxes from all the princes on behalf of the khan of the Golden Horde.[24][20] However, this role was a heavy burden on the prince.[25] Aleksandr Nevsky became grand prince in 1251, and when the Mongol census-takers and tax collectors came to Novgorod, there was resistance against what the Chronicle of Novgorod describes as "accursed, raw-eating Tartars" until Aleksandr was forced to lead an army into the city.[26]
By the early 14th century, two dynastic houses, those of Tver and Moscow, competed for the title.[24] Due to conflict among the princes, political life in the Russian principalities was highly unstable, with at least 10 Russian princes being executed during the reign of Özbeg Khan.[27] He later gave his support to Ivan I of Moscow, which allowed the house of Moscow to eventually dominate the other principalities, and later challenge the Golden Horde itself.[28][29] The seat of the Russian metropolitan was also moved to Moscow in 1325, establishing it as the spiritual center of Russian Orthodoxy.[30][31][32] Jani Beg (r. 1342–1357) continued to support the house of Moscow and relations between the Russian principalities became stable.[33] He was also able to maintain the balance of power between Moscow, Tver and Nizhny Novgorod.[34]
By 1371, Dmitry Donskoy was recognized as the grand prince of Moscow and Vladimir by both the Tatars and his cousins, and thus, the grand principality became his patrimony (otchina).[35] In his 1389 will, he was able to bequeath his "patrimony, the grand principality" to his eldest son.[36] Despite this, in the late 14th century, the grand prince of Moscow had little effective control over the other major political centers: Novgorod, Tver, Nizhny Novgorod-Suzdal and Ryazan.[37] Although the other Russian principalities rarely challenged Moscow's hegemony directly, they grew increasingly independent in their relations with the Golden Horde and Lithuania, with some princes styling themselves as grand princes.[37] However, this has been a point of contention among historians, with Anton Gorsky [ru] arguing that Nizhny Novgorod and Tver were only able to claim the status of grand principality in the 1360s.[38]
Vasily I of Moscow was able to take advantage of the political strife within the Golden Horde.[39] In 1392, he visited the court of Tokhtamysh, whose forces had recently been defeated by Timur, and was given permission to take the throne of Nizhny Novgorod-Suzdal.[39] However, the principality was not fully incorporated until the mid-15th century.[23] After Tokhtamysh's forces were destroyed in 1395, Vasily stopped paying tribute.[40] However, after Edigu launched a devastating invasion in 1408 and Tatar raids continued in the following years, Vasily was forced to resume paying tribute and visit the khan to renew his patent to the throne.[40] Once the Golden Horde fragmented into several smaller khanates, the grand princes of Moscow were able to eventually assert their authority over other Russian princes without Tatar approval; once the grand prince adopted the title of sovereign of all Russia, this marked the beginning of a new period.[41]
End of the appanage period
Between the accessions of Ivan III in 1462 and Ivan IV in 1533, there was not only the "gathering of the Russian lands" that took place but also the development of an autocratic power structure.[42] Although Ivan III did not completely end the practice of creating appanages, he saw appanages as a source of disunity and was able to bring the appanages inherited by his younger brothers under his effective control.[43] He bequeathed two-thirds of his lands to his son Vasily, while the remaining third was divided among his four younger sons, but their authority was strictly limited.[43] The last person to be granted an appanage principality was Ivan IV's son, Dmitry, who was given Uglich, in 1584.[44]
This "gathering of power" over the other principalities involved the extension of patrimonial power by applying the principle of the votchina to them.[42] The Russian Church supported this process, thereby implying that the Muscovite rulers "had an explicitly religious referent that did not include a discourse on natural law".[45] As a result, the concept of popular sovereignty did not develop, and to integrate new territories, local elites were absorbed into the court of the grand prince.[45] Around the same time, the system of mestnichestvo was also developed.[45]
The Russian Church not only preserved the idea of unity amidst political fragmentation but also influenced attitudes toward service, with nobles expected to serve the Muscovite ruler without the right to depart.[46] The monk Joseph of Volokolamsk, for instance, said the grand prince "was the master of all masters of the Russian land".[46] The dependence of the metropolitan also changed when the Russian Church became de facto autocephalous in 1448; the metropolitan was no longer confirmed by the patriarch of Constantinople, and thus became even more dependent on the grand prince, although the roots of this dependence go back to the Byzantine idea of symphonia.[47]
The relative swiftness of the strengthening of grand princely power, when compared to contemporary composite monarchies, meant that regional identities remained weak.[48] Not only were local elites absorbed, but the policy of gathering Russian lands meant that local self-government was also not tolerated, leading to the termination of the autonomies of Novgorod and Pskov in 1478 and 1510, respectively.[48] Moscow's absorption of Ryazan, the last remaining independent Russian principality, was little more than a formality;[49] it was dependent on Moscow until Oleg Ivanovich was deposed in 1520 and the principality was formally annexed the following year.[50] However, according to the historian Andreas Kappeler, in the territories acquired through expansion—such as the southern steppe and Siberia—the Russian government, "centralist and autocratic, was confronted with the task of integrating societies which possessed a corporate organization, different estates and regional traditions".[48] As a result, the government treated the oaths given by nomadic peoples and the indigenous Siberians as an act of eternal submission, which allowed them to remain largely undisturbed.[48] The image of the Russian Orthodox community playing a unifying role helped ensure that Russia did not become a composite state.[51][52]
Notes
References
- ↑ Riasanovsky 2005, pp. 34–35; Ziegler 2009, p. 15; Pipes 1995, p. 48–57; Paxton 1993, pp. 23–24, "The Kievan state collapsed in 1240 and the period that followed was known as Appanage Russia".
- ↑ Pipes 1995, p. 42, "The age when such subdividing took place – from the mid-twelfth to the mid-fifteenth century – is known in the historical literature as the 'appanage period' (udel'nyi period)"; Wieczynski 1976, p. 66.
- ↑ Ziegler 2009, p. 15; Wilbur 2004, p. 69, "Most historians since the nineteenth century—Russian, Soviet, and Western—have used the phrase 'appanage era' to designate the period between the collapse of Kievan Russia and the emergence of a centralized Russian state [...] The interpretation also set a new initial date for the era—the mid 1100s—which has become increasingly accepted by scholars in the field"; Riasanovsky 2005, pp. 34–35; Pipes 1995, p. 42; Wieczynski 1976, p. 66, "A term often used to designate that period of Russian history from the collapse of the Kievan state to the rise of the Principality of Moscow and its political independence from the Mongols".
- ↑ Feldbrugge 2017, pp. 307–308.
- ↑ Ziegler 2009, p. 15; Channon & Hudson 1995, p. 16; Feldbrugge 2017, p. 25, "the rulers of such principalities would then appoint subordinate princes to rule over what we designate as 'apanage principalities'. Russian sources often use udel'nye kniazhestva to refer to both categories. The difference is admittedly gradual; independent principalities all started out as apanage principalities and also an apanage principality could transform itself into an independent principality, given time, luck, and an adroit ruler".
- ↑ Fennell 2014, p. 163, "By the end of the thirteenth century the disintegration of Suzdalia was well under way with more than a dozen principalities virtually separated from Vladimir, their rulers out of the running for the grand-princely throne".
- ↑ Feldbrugge 2017, pp. 307–311.
- ↑ Feldbrugge 2009, p. 264.
- ↑ Feldbrugge 2017, pp. 329, 815, 825; Wilbur 2004, p. 69, "This tumultuous situation ended only as Moscow fashioned an autocracy capable of 'gathering the Russian lands'"; Wieczynski 1976, p. 66, "The period was ended by the centralizing policies of the princes of Moscow and their success in "gathering the Russian lands into one centrally administrated political, social and economic unit".
- ↑ Riasanovsky & Steinberg 2019, p. 35, "The long reign of Ivan III, from 1462 to 1505, has generally been considered, together with the following reign of Vasilii III, as the termination of the appanage period and the beginning of a new age in Russian history, that of Muscovite Russia"; Sashalmi 2022, p. 61, "Muscovite Russia (dated from 1462 onwards)"; Ziegler 2009, p. 24, "Ivan III... continued the process of gathering the Russian lands together, expanding and centralizing the Muscovite state and effectively ending the Appanage period".
- 1 2 3 Ziegler 2009, p. 15.
- ↑ Ziegler 2009, pp. 16–17.
- ↑ Wilbur 2004, p. 69.
- ↑ Vásáry 2014, p. 263, "While Kievan Rus' and later the Russian principalities were governed de facto by the grand prince and the princes, spiritual leadership was in the hands of the Byzantine emperor".
- ↑ Favereau & Pochekaev 2023, p. 249.
- ↑ Vásáry 2014, pp. 263–264.
- ↑ Fennell 2014, p. 17.
- 1 2 Favereau & Pochekaev 2023, p. 250.
- 1 2 Favereau & Pochekaev 2023, p. 262.
- 1 2 3 Gonneau 2022, p. 373.
- ↑ Favereau 2021, p. 180.
- ↑ Fennell 2014, p. 84.
- 1 2 Gonneau 2022, p. 374.
- 1 2 3 Favereau & Pochekaev 2023, p. 282.
- ↑ Galeotti 2024, p. 85.
- ↑ Galeotti 2024, pp. 85–86.
- ↑ Favereau & Pochekaev 2023, p. 283.
- ↑ Favereau & Pochekaev 2023, pp. 283–284.
- ↑ Fennell 2014, p. 167, "By the end of the 1320s Moscow had won the struggle for supremacy; from 1331 onwards no more princely rivalries were encouraged by the Tatars and Moscow was allowed to flourish and to provide a barrier to Lithuanian expansion. Eventually, at the end of the 1370s, this defensive and somewhat negative attitude towards the Tatars changed to one of offensive aggression. Moscow had become a power capable of dealing with the Horde on equal — or nearly equal — terms".
- ↑ Crummey 2014, p. 40.
- ↑ Ziegler 2009, p. 22.
- ↑ Galeotti 2024, pp. 87–88, "Metropolitan Pyotr formally moved his seat from Vladimir to Moscow: it was now the capital of the Russian faith".
- ↑ Favereau & Pochekaev 2023, p. 284.
- ↑ Favereau & Pochekaev 2023, p. 286.
- ↑ Fennell 2014, pp. 129, 164.
- ↑ Fennell 2014, p. 164.
- 1 2 Crummey 2014, p. 56.
- ↑ Favereau & Pochekaev 2023, p. 285.
- 1 2 Crummey 2014, p. 63.
- 1 2 Crummey 2014, p. 65.
- ↑ Feldbrugge 2009, p. 237.
- 1 2 Sashalmi 2022, p. 70.
- 1 2 Anderson 2014, p. 254.
- ↑ Feldbrugge 2017, p. 25.
- 1 2 3 Sashalmi 2022, p. 71.
- 1 2 Sashalmi 2022, p. 75.
- ↑ Sashalmi 2022, p. 76.
- 1 2 3 4 Sashalmi 2022, p. 79.
- ↑ Crummey 2014, p. 93.
- ↑ Feldbrugge 2017, p. 31.
- ↑ Sashalmi 2022, p. 80.
- ↑ Filyushkin 2021, pp. 205–207.
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